Acknowledgement is long overdue that our government took us to war in Iraq on the basis of deception and a breach of international law.
These twin factors have been fundamental to public concern about government behaviour, and were central to the mass opposition to the war.
Firstly the question of deception:
The government’s primary justification for war was that Iraq was an imminent threat, capable of using WMD, and a danger to Britain’s national interests and security.
This case was made in the Iraq Dossier, published on 24th September 2002 – subsequently termed the Dodgy Dossier, which included claims:
- that Iraq had procured significant quantities of uranium from Africa – the so-called ‘yellow cake from Niger’ scandal
- that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons deployable in 45 minutes – perhaps the most sensational and widely misrepresented claim
- that Iraq had begun developing long range missiles
- that Iraq had mobile labs for military use
- that it had constructed equipment for a nuclear missile capable of striking British bases on Cyprus
Rapidly scrutinised by independent experts, the dossier gave rise to charges of exaggeration and misrepresentation.
It was concern about the apparent wildness of the claims involved that contributed to scale of the first really mass demonstration against a war on Iraq, held on 28th September 2002, with 400,000 participating.
By 7th February 2003, The Guardian was recognising what had been extensively debated throughout the autumn - that the ‘UK war dossier was a sham’. Supposedly British ‘intelligence’, it transpired that material in the dossier was lifted from academic articles, some several years old. It showed no independent source of information on Iraq’s internal policies.
In fact, it was subsequently reported at the time of the Hutton Inquiry in September 2003 that the dossier was ‘sexed up’ - that changes were made to the dossier between an early draft on September 2nd and final publication on September 24th, 2002. Close analysis showed they were inserted to make the case for urgent action against Iraq and to justify war.
For example, the title had been ‘Iraq’s programme for WMD’; ‘programme’ suggests development, but this was changed to ‘Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction’, suggesting they already had them. There was similar rephrasing throughout, including to suggest that the nuclear threat was rapidly increasing. A reference to British bases in Cyprus was added to justify the claim that British interests were under threat.
A key change was made at the last minute to remove phrases implying that Saddam Hussein’s intent was defensive rather than offensive. The statement ‘Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons if he believes his regime is under threat’, was removed on the grounds that it backed up the argument that there was no CBW threat and we would only create one if we attacked him.
To address secondly the question of legality:
The government claimed that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 – dated 8th November 2002 – was sufficient legal grounds to use armed force against Iraq. This was widely disputed and challenged in a legal case by CND against the government, funded by mass public donations. Opinion from Rabinder Singh QC and Charlotte Kilroy stated:
- UNSCR 1441 does not authorise the use of force by member states of the UN.
- The UK would be in breach of international law if it were to use force against Iraq in reliance on Resolution 1441 without a further Security Council Resolution.
The case was heard in the High Court of Justice on 17th December 2002. Regrettably the Court concluded:
- That it had no jurisdiction to declare the interpretation of an international instrument – it was not part of domestic law.
- That to do so would be damaging to the public interest in the fields of international relations, national security and defence.
Nevertheless, other legal opinion continued to assert that a second UN resolution would be necessary to make an attack legal. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, however, insisted that ‘1441 gives us the authority we need’.
By the end of 2002, there was a growing popular rejection of increasingly apparent government manipulation and lies to secure their preferred outcome.
Of course this public sentiment needed expression, and found it in the form of the anti-war movement. From October 2001 this developed strongly, with the newly founded Stop the War Coalition working together with CND and the Muslim Association of Britain to organise many significant anti-war demonstrations, from the end of 2001 onwards.
The greatest expression of this was February 15th, 2003. In the days before that demonstration, polls showed a significant majority of British voters against military attack. Polls also showed that at least one person from 1.25 million households went on the march, confirming estimates that up to 2 million people participated.
Tens of millions more demonstrated across the world with researchers assessing this as the largest protest event in human history. This led New York Times writer Patrick Tyler to claim, on February 17th, that there were two superpowers on the planet, the US and world public opinion.
Ultimately the protests were ignored. The illegality of the war was disregarded, and those responsible for the lies continued to use them to justify the attack and subsequent occupation which together resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and untold human suffering.
We seek from the Chilcot Inquiry an accurate reckoning of the factors involved and we wish finally to get clarity from the British state about this disastrous war – the lies, the crimes, the culpability and responsibility.
Our government owes no less to the families of those who paid the ultimate price, having been sent to fight in an illegal war. And to those innocent Iraqis who lost their lives.
CND maintains the same position that it did 13 years ago – where individuals, no matter how lofty, are found to be responsible for crimes, they should face the full power of the law. No one is exempt from justice.